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Abstract 
The paper examines the relation between stock price synchronicity and insider trading using 
data from the largest emerging market, China, through the years 2007 to 2010. Contrary to the 
conventional methodology of analyzing the cumulative abnormal return generated by insiders, 
the paper focuses on the extent of firm-specific information production from different types of 
insider transactions using stock price synchronicity as the proxy for firm-specific information 
incorporation. I find that insider trading does increase the relative firm-specific information 
incorporation into stock pricing. Although directors and large shareholders trade more 
frequently, they offer minimal valuable firm-specific information, whereas supervisors offer 
the most private information. Moreover, good corporate governance constrains the leakage of 
firm-level information into the market. Finally, I find that insider trading tends to disclose 
more information in state-owned corporations. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Chinese government has provided stringent regulations to control insider 
trading. Since 2008, the Chinese Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) has investigated 
295 cases considered as insider trading\ which generally involve an enormous amount of 
capital benefit. Insider trading is regarded as a cancer injuring the capital market operation 
and a unanimous agreement on its eradication seems to have been reached. However, in the 
academe, insider trading, which is divided into legal and illegal categories juristically, is a 
controversial issue that has to be discussed. 
Since the 1960s, legal insider trading has been the topic of intense interest in economic and 
legal investigations due to its crucial influence on the capital market and investment 
environment. It should be noted that in the succeeding parts, I refer to legal insider trading 
whenever insider trading is mentioned. According to the 1968 Williams Act Amendments 
Section 10(b) of the US and China Security Law^ insider trading refers to purchases or sales 
by people who possess some material non-public information within the corporations to earn 
profits through trading actions, where "material" information means significantly relevant 
news for the price of stocks, such as stock splits, dividend increase, mergers and acquisition, 
and investment decision, among others. Juristically, those who can obtain such privileged 
private information are regarded as insiders. 
The issue of whether or not to limit insider trading remains a controversy. A number of studies 
1 Obtained on May 30, 2011, from the official website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ 
2 The Security Law of China was promulgated in 1998 and revised on 27 October 2005. The revised version provides explicit 
definitions of insider trading, the punishable actions, relative participants, and penalties from articles 47 to 204. 
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based on U.S. data indicate that insiders are better informed and can achieve returns in excess 
of the average market level, implying that insiders trade on private information (Jaffe, 1974; 
Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988). This violates the strong form of 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that stock price reflects both public and private 
information. Mimicking the transactions by insiders has been suggested as an important 
investing strategy. Basing on the study of the errors predicted from the market model, Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998) show that, on average, insider profits from trading in shares of their 
companies are at a moderate 3% per annum for annual holding periods after subtracting the 
2% assumed transaction cost. Moreover, the welfare of outsiders is expropriated by insiders, 
leading to less participation of outsiders and thus, to a less active capital market (Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2009; Manove, 1989). On the contrary, several scholars suggest that 
insider trading advances market liquidity and impels the stock price to achieve its intrinsic 
value (Cao, Field, and Hanka, 2004; Manne, 1966). Additionally, insider trading, which 
performs a complementary role to the compensation rewarded to managers, may reduce the 
conflict of interests between agency and principal. Thus, it performs as a device that 
stimulates corporate governance efficiency (Manne, 1966; Demsets, 1986). 
Advocators of insider trading maintain that its essential benefit is the acceleration of firm 
specific information revelation in the capital market (Manne, 1966; Calton and Fischel, 1983). 
The important thing is not only whether insiders could gain abnormal profit from the trading, 
but also the content of the information with which they trade on. Literature state that the 
abnormal returns from insider trading can be attributed to better predictability of market 
returns due to the changes in business conditions or market fundamentals instead of corporate 
information (Seyhun, 1988; Seyhun, 1992). Moreover, insider transactions could be motivated 
by the perceived mispricing from market-wide phenomenon such as noise trading (Rozeff and 
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Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). This is defined as 
contrarian belief hypothesis. Studies on insider trading in developed countries show that 
insiders are generally contrarian traders. Corporate insiders may perceive the misevaluation of 
stock prices of corresponding firms and form contrarian decisions when performing insider 
trading without substantial new firm-specific information produced. Moreover, Chan et al. 
(2007) find that managers can leam of the firm fundamentals from stock prices and make 
investment decisions basing on such information. When they perceive higher deviation of 
firm fundamentals from the industry and market, they tend to reconsider their investment 
plans, which could influence their operations in relation to the firms. In contrast, laws and 
regulations in most emerging market countries are weak, which provides a significant 
opportunity for corporate insiders to trade firm shares based on new firm-specific information 
gained and produced. This is defined as the superior information hypothesis (Givoly and 
Palmon, 1985; Seyhun, 1986; Ke et al, 2003; Jiang and Zaman, 2010). The production and 
revelation of new firm-level information cause the actions of insiders to create a remarkable 
predictive power in explaining the firms' future development. An insider can trade firm shares 
based on either contrarian beliefs or superior information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; 
Jiang and Zaman, 2010). 
Although information content performs a relatively important role in the exploration of 
insider trading, few studies have examined the amount of firm-specific information that is 
disseminated by insider trading and whether insider trading can significantly increase 
market-level information. Thus, this paper attempts to investigate the informational role of 
insider trading. To accomplish this goal, I use stock price synchronicity as the proxy to 
measure the extent by which market and industry returns explain the variation in firm stock, 
based on prior research (Roll, 1988; Dumev et al., 2003). 
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According to Roll (1988), higher R from the market model indicate a high stock price 
synchronicity, which suggests that much of the firm-specific information is incorporated into 
stock price. He also provided evidence that the idiosynchratic risks, which are firm size and 
the identifiable news release from the financial press have little relation to the stock price 
synchronicity. Therefore, it suggests the price fluctuations are likely due to the private 
firm-specific information disclosure or noise trading in the market. Using accounting 
measures to reflect the return news of the firms, Dumev et al.(2003) also finds that 
information about future earnings is impounded in the current stock price. He defines the 
stock price variation as the portion of a firm's stock return that is unexplained by the market 
or industry returns. Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2002) show that asymmetry information 
between insiders and outsiders could be efficiently reduced if a stronger flow of firm-specific 
information is allowed. More external financing and efficient capital allocation leads to less 
synchronicity. Based on effective spread, price impact or Amihud illiquidity measures, Chan, 
Hameed and Kang (2007) find that stocks which co-move more with the market have higher 
liquidity. 
More recent papers focus on the relationship between stock synchronicity and country level 
situation. Morck et al. (2000) suggest that weak property rights have prevented firm-specific 
information from being incorporated into the stock price and therefore, stock prices generally 
move together in the emerging market. A number of factors can contribute to the lack of 
firm-specific information, such as lax law regulation, insufficient corporate transparency, and 
governance structure deficiency. First, although laws and regulations on insider trading have 
been established, enforcement in developing countries is generally not well implemented 
(Chan and Hameed, 2006). Second, Jin and Myers (2006) show that less accounting 
transparency leads to a higher stock price synchronicity. Supervision from reliable 
4 
international accounting firms could also assist in the release of firm-level information. Third, 
the concentrated ownership structure prevents private information from being incorporated 
into the stock price (Gul et al., 2010). Under this circumstance, controlling owners may 
withhold value-relevant private information from the outsiders to gain profit, leading to 
higher capital cost for uninformed investors. 
Prior studies have focused on developed markets. However, the crucial and unexplored issue 
is whether insider trading can influence the extent of stock price synchronicity in emerging 
markets. This paper aims to investigate the informational role of insider trading in China, 
which is the largest emerging market. There are several reasons why China is an appropriate 
subject for this study. Because the Security Law was established in 1997, thus a relatively 
improved record of insider trading exists in comparison with other developing markets. 
Moreover, the controlling shareholders of listed A-share companies are generally connected 
with the government. Evidence from previous studies show that synchronicity in China is 
relatively high (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Gul et al. 2010), which to some extent is related 
with the special corporate governance in China. More than 50% of the A-share listed 
companies are state-owned companies, which exerts enormous effect on industry and market. 
Therefore, insiders in these corporations could disseminate more market-level or 
industry-level information instead of firm-specific information because of their better 
knowledge of national policy and market change. The effect of insider trading on information 
flow under such circumstance is worth exploring. 
First, exploration of the link between insider trading activities and the flow of firm-specific 
information into price is studied, where stock price synchronicity is used as the proxy. Next, 
the study delves further into the question of whether the trading of different identities of 
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insiders can convey a diverse amount of firm-specific information. Various participants in a 
corporation may own different qualities and quantities of private information, which could be 
more firm-related, external policy and market-related news. This disparity could lead to 
different types of information released through insider trading. I focus on four crucial types of 
corporate insiders in China, namely, Executive, Director, Supervisor, and Substantial 
Shareholders holding more than 5% of the total shares of the firm. The relationship between 
the executives and synchronicity is the most direct. According to Manne (1966), managers 
can be compensated through insider trading. Therefore, they may communicate more private 
information to market participants through their trading behavior. Substantial shareholders are 
usually regarded as quasi-insiders, who are within the companies and have the right to know 
the financial and operational conditions of the firms. However, they may not be updated and 
offered the most recent and useful pieces of information. It is unclear whether substantial 
shareholders trade firm shares based on certain private information. 
Finally, I explore the impact of corporate governance on insider trading and the release of 
firm information. As a set of processes, policies, and relations of various stakeholders 
involved in administering the operation of a firm, corporate governance certainly influences 
the actions of different corporate participants and the expectation of investors. Effective 
corporate governance may limit the possibilities of insider trading. Consequently, the 
revelation of firm-specific information is restrained through this unofficial channel, but more 
through public announcements and reports. 
The paper is organized as follows. The institutional background and research hypothesis are 
introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents the discussion on the construction of variables in 
the context of the Chinese market, as well as the specific models used for hypothesis testing. 
6 
Section 4 describes the samples and puts forward the descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
the regressions analysis. Section 6 provides robust evidence on whether insider trading is 
driven by private information. The final section contains the conclusions. 
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2. Institutional background and research hypotheses 
2.1 Rules and regulations in China 
When analyzing the laws regulating insider trading, a few aspects, including the scope of 
insiders, the length of period within which insiders must report their tradings, and the level of 
the enforcement of the regulation, must be focused on (Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog, 
2003). 
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for 
regulating legal or illegal insider trading. The U.S. Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 
and the 1968 Williams Act amendments address insider trading directly. Under Section 10(b)， 
insiders are not only "corporate insiders" who are defined as directors or officers of the 
corporation or major shareholders holding greater than 10% shares, but also anyone who 
obtains material and non-public information from a corporate insider or issuer, or who steals 
such information from another resource defined as "quasi-insiders". Later, outside auditors, 
outsider lawyers, investment bankers alike, who are temporarily retained by the corporation 
but have access to material non-public information, are also incorporated into the scope of 
insiders, namely "intermediary insiders". In the U.S., the capital gains that insiders earn on 
short-term swings, usually within six months, must be repaid to the company. The 
transactions should then be published in SEC's online Insider Trading Report to make the 
transactions public (FGR, 2003). 
As regards the sequence of information dissemination process, it could be roughly classified 
into three stages, namely, initial information revelation to insiders, public announcements, and 
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reporting of repackaged information from analysts. In the U.S., the second reporting process, 
which determines the size of the abnormal returns measured around the announcement of 
insider trading, takes at most 40 days. Finally, for the enforcement of regulation, different 
civil or criminal penalties are imposed according to the extent of commitment. Maximum 
criminal fines of up to $1,000,000 for individuals and $2,500,000 for corporations and a 
maximum jail term of 5 to 10 years can be handed down as sentence. The harsher the 
enforcement penalty is, the lower the probability or volume of insider trading. 
In 1993, the Provisional Measures for the Prohibition of Securities Fraud (Provisional 
Measures) was promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the 
centralized regulation institution responsible for security supervision in China, to regulate 
various kinds of fraudulent misconduct in the stock market, including insider trading. In 
October 1997, insider trading, as a misdemeanor, was included in the provisions of the 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. In July 1999, the Securities Law of the 
people's Republic of China (Securities Law) was finally introduced to capital market. Various 
articles and notifications issued by Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
CRSC further illustrated the details of the related actions and enforcement pertaining to 
insider trading. 
Article 68 of Security Law provides a specific list of the types of persons considered as 
insiders. Generally, the definition includes directors, supervisors, managers and shareholders 
who hold not less than 5% of the shares in a company, people who are able to obtain material 
information concerning company trading, staff members of the regulatory authority, and 
relevant administrators. The list can be divided into two groups, the traditional corporate 
insiders and temporary or constructive insiders, which include the underwriters, accountants, 
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and lawyers. This is similar to the concept of "intermediate insiders" in the U.S. In 2007, the 
Definition of Insider Trading Regulation further incorporated the spouses of insiders and 
people who illegally seize or exchange private information in the same manner as the insiders, 
which further broadened the definition of what constitutes an insider. 
With regard to the definition of insider information, the standard is slightly vague and 
indeterminate because only specific types of facts considered to be private information are 
addressed which include major changes in the company's equity structure, security for debts, 
distribution of dividend, business guidelines, and major investments among others. Compared 
to the definition under the U.S. law, the Chinese law defines insider information to be any 
"material," "non-public" information. The definition of insider information in the Securities 
Laws in China embraces specific types and examples, thus, there is no authentic and definite 
standard. 
Compared to the penalties provided under the U.S. law, the fines imposed on insiders are set 
at a maximum of RMB 600,000 in China, which is relatively low. However, the speed of 
reporting is much faster in China as the law requires insiders to report on the second day after 
their transactions^ Moreover, there are time restrictions on the transactions of insiders. They 
could trade at most 30 days before the official announcements of company statements, 10 
days before the public performance report, and during other time periods as regulated by the 
CSRS.4 
3 CSRS Document [2007] No. 56, Articlell: Regulations about the management of changes in the shareholding by the 
directors, supervisors and higher executive officers in the listed companies; Shanghai Stock Exchange Document [2007] 
NO.29 Note to enhance the management of shareholding by the directors, supervisors and higher executive officers in the 
listed companies. 
4 CSRS Document [2007] No. 56, Articlel2: Regulations about the management of changes in the shareholding by the 
directors, supervisors and higher executive officers in the listed companies. 丄。 
2.2 Ownership structure and corporate governance in China 
In China, two different stock markets exist simultaneously, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which were established in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively. Firms listed on the two markets are not allowed to cross-list and are regulated 
separately by the respective stock exchanges. During all the listed companiesi, if the shares 
are traded in RMB, the shares are referred to as A-share, whereas shares traded in foreign 
currencies are named B-share, and are intended to attract the foreign investors and large 
overseas entities to invest in Chinese corporations. Both A-share and B-share listed firms are 
based in mainland China. Some Chinese companies opt to be listed outside China directly. H 
shares, also known as the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index, are shares of firms 
incorporated in mainland China but traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Double-listing 
as A, B, and H shares are allowed. If the shares of companies are traded as B and H shares 
simultaneously, they are obligated to follow the supervision and regulation of the respective 
stock exchanges and may face more stringent monitoring and accounting information release. 
The constitutions of the listed shares in China possess a unique feature which is the existence 
of segregation between tradable and non-tradable shares. The special institutional system 
creates inefficiency in stock liquidity and server interest unbalance among the shareholders. 
Large shareholders, particularly the government, have inadequate incentives to improve the 
operation process and earning capacity of enterprises because the proportion of their shares 
are not tradable on the stock market, leading them to neglect stock price movements and 
hidden driven forces. However, they are normally the main controllers of corporations and are 
responsible for the decision making and budget planning. Therefore, the interest of small 
shareholders is expropriated. The split share structure reform, which tries to transform 
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non-tradable shares into liquid shares^ has been in effect since 2005. Approximately 34% of 
the shares cannot be traded freely on the stock market on average because of the requirement 
of gradual transformation by CSRS which considers the stabilization of the stock price in the 
capital market. Non-tradable shares are composed mainly of state-owned shares and legal 
person shares with part of the natural person share being owned by the founders of the 
companies. 
Listed companies in China are characterized by a highly concentrated ownership structure, 
with the state as the controlling shareholder. Until April 2002, there were 1102 companies 
listed in the A stock market, with the average shareholding fraction of as high as 44.86% for 
the largest shareholder. More than half of the listed companies had the largest shareholder 
owning more than 50% of the shares. Moreover, more than 80% of the shares are state-owned. 
On average, the shareholding fraction of the largest shareholder in the US is 22.8% in 1997 
and 14% in Britain (Tan, Zhang, and Bai, 2002). 
In addition to the fact that the different positions held by the insiders influence the revelation 
of firm-specific information, various corporate governance features could affect the release of 
information as well. Manne (1966) raises a crucial argument that corporate agencies regard 
the abnormal returns from insider trading as extra benefit substituting working bonus, which 
could mitigate the principal-agency problem. Good corporate governance will protect the 
interests of shareholders and thus reduce the opportunities for insider trading (Maug, 1999). 
Consequently, the rate of release of information through this channel will be lowered. On the 
other hand, Gul et al. (2010) provide evidence that good corporate governance, like audit 
from international firms will facilitate information flow by encouraging firms to disclose 
5 On 31 Jan 2004, State Council in China issued the Opinions about how to promote the openness and stabilization of the 
capital market, which proposed the question on how to solve the split share structure of the stock market in China. 
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more accurate and precise corporate news through public announcement and reporting. If 
information released through regular corporate reporting channels is adequate and smooth, 
insider trading would not add much new information so that insider trading has insignificant 
effects on stock price synchronicity. 
2.3 Research hypothesis 
Generally, past studies use event study to test the influence of insider trading on market 
efficiency by examining the abnormal rate of return for the period immediately after an 
announcement of a significant economic event, such as a stock split, a proposed merger, or a 
stock issue. These sets of studies focus on the analysis of abnormal rates of return that deviate 
from long-term expectations to determine the predictability of information on risk-adjusted 
returns. This paper focuses on insider trading and the content of information incorporation in 
the stock price. The stock could be cyclical or counter-cyclical to the movements of market or 
industry returns. As long as the general information of the market and industry is received by 
the public, the stock return could be well predicted. This refers to a situation where more 
market or industry information is impounded in the stock price which implies higher stock 
synchronicity, and vice versa. 
As mentioned in the first part, insider trading generates abnormal returns based on two kinds 
of motivations, holding of superior information and using contrarian strategies (Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2005; Gul et al., 2010). Lakonishok and Lee (2001) suggest that insiders predict 
market movements better than other individual investors using simple contrarian strategies, 
whereas Seyhun (1986) and Ke et al. (2003) support the view that insider trading is based on 
the holding of superior information of the firms. For the latter case, as the holder of private 
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information, the insiders' trading should reveal firm-specific information to the market, which 
will result in lower stock synchronicity. In contrast, in a firm with less insider trading 
activities, ceteris paribus, the stock price synchronicity of that firm should be higher, 
reflecting more market and industry information. For the former case, insiders' trial to 
arbitrage through mispricing could indirectly inform the public of the fundamental values of 
the stocks, which would leak firm information as well. Unless, as what Seyhun (1992) 
maintains, the insiders trade based on the better knowledge or predication of change of the 
market or economic environment. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is proposed. 
Hypothesis 1: More insider trading will induce lower synchronicity, which means more 
firm-specific information is impounded into stock price. 
Corporate governance involves numerous stakeholders holding different positions. This paper 
focuses on the following four essential insiders within the companies, namely, directors, 
managers, supervisors, and large shareholders holding greater than 5% of the total company 
shares. The Board of Directors, as the supreme governing body of the corporation, is 
responsible for the practice and execution of the decision made by the General Shareholders' 
Meeting to best serve the interest of various parties, particularly that of the shareholders. In 
effective corporate governance, the positions of the chairman and directors should not be of 
an executive nature. Otherwise, powerful decision making becomes concentrated on one or a 
few persons. Directors are more involved in the decision-making process instead of daily 
operation and thus have less familiarity with short-term firm-level news and thus can offer 
less firm-specific private information than the managers of the firms. 
The Supervisory Board, which is composed of representatives from shareholders and 
employees, is responsible for monitoring the entire corporation's overall performance and 
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operation, auditing the financial situation, and reporting to the Board of Directors. Therefore, 
supervisors could have a clear understanding over the administration and operational 
performance of the entire firm. Their insider trading could offer firm-specific information to 
outside investors. Compared with the directors and managers, supervisors are not directly 
involved in the operational activities and decision-making process of firms. Therefore, 
monitoring of their trading behavior would be less stringent than those of directors and 
managers, which can lead to more informative transactions. 
Substantial shareholders with more than 5% of the total shares of the company but do not sit 
in the Board of Directors are the least informative participants among the four categories. 
Although they are major investors and promoters, they do not participate in the administration 
and governance of the corporation. Therefore, while their trading is included in the definition 
of insider trading, it could be less firm-specific informative. 
Hypothesis 2a: Managers, as the daily operators of the companies, trade on more 
firm-specific information. Supervisors, through careful monitoring of the firm's 
financial situation and performance following the decisions made, also trade on 
firm-specific information, whereas other types of insiders may trade on less 
firm-specific information. 
Hypothesis 2b: Supervisors, who are less monitored than other types of insiders, could 
offer more informative transactions. 
Ownership concentration and corporate governance could influence the probability of insider 
trading (Maug, 1999; Theissen, and Betzer, 2005). Rozanov (2008) supports the view that 
effective monitoring of management by the board could limit opportunistic insider trading. 
Bai et al. (2003) maintain that good corporate governance could enhance the market valuation 
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of firms. Effective corporate governance limits the probability of insider trading, which may 
constrain the revelation of firm-specific information to the market. Listed corporations are 
obliged to report to the public in a timely and frequent manner in order to disclose firm 
information to outsiders according to CSRS and SHSE/SZSE regulations. With more stringent 
supervision and audit, more firm-level information should be released through regular 
channels instead of insider trading, because insider trading is scrutinized more carefully. Gul 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that firms with stricter monitoring by the Big 4 international 
audit companies and possess foreign shares can facilitate the flows of firm-specific 
information to the market. 
Hypothesis 3: With good corporate governance, insider trading should contain less 
firm-level information. 
Ownership structure is a key determinant of corporate governance (La Porta, 2000). The 
complex structure of the Chinese stock market leads to the following characteristics of 
corporate governance in China. With the central government as the major shareholder and real 
controller, the agencies representing the government are not considered as the principal and 
their interests do not align with the central government. This could lead to ineffective 
management and can result in severe information leakage through insider trading. 
Hypothesis 4: More firm-level information is released through insider trading in 
companies with more state-owned shares. 
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3. Construction of variables and model specification 
3.1 Stock return synchronicity (SYNCH) 
The stock price of an individual firm includes three sources of information, the market, 
industry, and the firm itself. Dumev et al. (2003) and Wurgler (2000) provide evidence that 
stock return synchronicity could be used to measure the relative information content of the 
three sources. As the device to reflect the incorporation of firm-specific information, stock 
market synchronicity is not only what Morck et al.(2000) introduces in his paper, which only 
includes market return into the stock market model to analyze the synchronicity, while 
Roll(1988) and Piotrosky and Roulstone (2004) include industry returns to estimate the 
synchronicity as well. In the market model, firm-specific factors such as market capitalization 
and book-to-market ratio are excluded, thus leading to the error term s to measure all the 
information that is neither market nor industry. 
First, I obtain the coefficient of determination for each firm i in fiscal year t using daily 
returns and the following market model: 
RET],,’d =a + p.MKTRET^,, + + ^.INDRET.,, + PJNDREJ]’,,d—\ + e 丨丨� 
where RET., ^ denotes the daily return for each firm i on day d in year t, and MKTRET 
and INDRET denote the value-weighted^ market and industry return, respectively. To 
alleviate the possible serial correlation, the lagged industry and market returns are included. 
Because the China A-share market is divided into two components, the Shanghai Security 
Exchange and Shenzhen Security Exchange, market return as used in this paper refers to the 
6 One feature of the Chinese stock market is the existence of negotiated and non-negotiated shares for listed companies, 
particularly for state-owned enterprises. Value-weighted here refers to the fact that stock returns are weighted by the value 
of tradable shares instead of the value of total shares outstanding. 
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separate daily market return for the two categories. The value-weighted industry return is 
created using returns from all firms within the same industry according to the 13-category 
classification of CSRC in day d with firm i，s daily return omitted. 
Second, I utilize Rl , for each firm per year using Eq. (1) to obtain stock price synchronicity. 
Because Rl , is within [0,1], logarithm transformation is used to eliminate the constraints of 
the range in order to create an unrestricted continuous variable following a more smooth 
normal distribution (Morck, 2000; Gul et al., 2010). Synchronicity (SYNCH) is measured for 
each firm-year in the sample. Higher R^ and synchronicity represent a firm's higher 
correlation with the market and industry. 
s y n c h , , = l o g ( - ^ ) . (2) 7 
3.2 Insider trading 
Only the component of relative order imbalance that has an impact on the return is expected 
to convey valuable information (O'Hara, 2003; Sias and Whidbee, 2008). For insider trading, 
information disclosure is influenced by the net of total shares purchased minus total shares 
sold in each year for each firm, which could be defined as the net insider demand. 
It has been proved that aggregate insider trading can be used to predict stock price returns 
(Seyhun, 1988, 1992, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Lakonishok, 2001; Chan and 
Hameed, 2006). Aggregate insider trading is measured using the total number of transactions 
7 The sign of stock synchronicity does not have specific meanings here. The positive sign means the R^  from the market 
model is higher than 50%, whereas the negative sign indicates that R^  is less than 50%; comparatively more firm-specific 
information is included. 
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of purchasing by insiders less the total number of transactions of selling by insiders, as a 
fraction of the sum of both. One of the essential consensus behind this view is that insider 
selling has restricted predictive power in explaining the abnormal return gained by insiders as 
compared to buying actions (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1988; Cheuk, 2006). 
Insiders may sell for various reasons, including liquidity needs, diversification of portfolio 
risks, or bad predictions of the future performance of a corporation. Although they may buy 
stocks because of the requirement of exercising options, researchers tend to believe insider 
purchasing is owing to knowing the goods news of their own firm. Several studies have 
implied that insider selling is less informative than buying. According to Cheuk et al. (2006), 
although insiders are able to earn abnormal returns from both purchasing and selling activities 
in the Hong Kong market, they sell much more shares than buy. Moreover, investors have to 
own stocks in order to be able sell them when they receive adverse news on the firm. Stocks 
are sometimes borrowed, which raises the cost of insider selling. One unique but vital feature 
in China is that the investors are forbidden to short sell in the stock market, which provides an 
external limit on the informational power of selling actions. 
First, following Seyhun (1992)，I use the net purchasing ratio, defined as the amount of 
difference between shares purchased and shares sold by insiders divided by the sum of insider 
purchases and sales in a calendar year as representative of the relative insider trading for firm 
i in year t. There is a tendency for insiders to take trading actions before the announcement of 
news and recover their original possession status after the event, hence, net insider trading 
could reveal more information content. 
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NPR, = ^ , (3) 8 
7=1 
where j is the total number of trading days in year t and BUY“人 SELL") is equal to the total 
number of shares purchases (sold) by the registered insider of firm i during fiscal year t. 
Second, following Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), I consider the effect of purchased insider 
shares only; thus, insider trading behavior is measured using the firm's total annual shares 
purchased divided by the sum of total shares transacted by insiders in year t. This purchasing 
ratio is for robust testing with ignorance of offset effect by insider selling. 
PR 丨 t = - ^ 
Third, the above measures, following previous works, focus more on the intensity of insider 
transactions to the entire insider trading; hence, I define ITij to measure the intensity of 
insider trading to the annual total trading volume for firm i in year t as another alternative 
proxy as follows: 
IT, = 巴 
annual trading volume in year t (5) 
8 Based on Synhun (1988,1992), Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), and Lakonishok (2001), this refers to years when there are 
no insider trading or when the number of shares purchased equal number of shares sold are excluded. 
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3.3 Control variables 
3.3.1 Firm size {Inasset) 
Firm size, denoted as Inasset, is the natural logarithm form of total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year. Firms with larger size constitutes a heavier weight of each stock in the market 
return index and results in higher estimated R based on the value-weighted return (Chan and 
Hameed, 2006; Gul et al., 2010). A positive relation between synchronicity and firm size is 
expected. Collins and Kothari (1989) show that earnings of large firms are impounded into 
stock price earlier than those of small and medium firms. 
3.3.2 Book to market ratio (BM) 
Book to market ratio, which is equivalent to the book value of common equity scaled by 
market capitalization at the end of fiscal year t，represents the relative equity valuation of the 
stock. Low BMit means that the stock is a growth stock whose revenues and earnings are 
expected to increase at a faster rate than that of an average company within the same industry. 
High BMit on the other hand, indicates a value stock whose growth potential is relatively low 
(Fama and French, 1992). It is likely that BM and stock synchronicity have a positive 
relationship because stocks with higher growth potential are usually owned by smaller firms 
whose earnings and income are not stable and who possess more firm information 
incorporated in the stock price. 
3.3.3 Trading volume (VOL) 
Higher trading volume induces a quicker adjustment of price because the stock could react to 
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market information more frequently, thereby leading to higher stock synchronicity. It is 
defined as the trading volume of the current year scaled by total tradable shares outstanding at 
the end of the fiscal year. O'Hara (2003) argues that liquidity could be incorporated into the 
asset pricing models because of the existence of asymmetric information. Therefore, I use 
total annual trading volume as one of the proxies for stock liquidity. 
3.3.4 Leverage ratio (LEV) 
Leverage ratio is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year of firm i. Following Gul et al. (2010) and Chan and Hameed (2006), leverage out ratio is 
incorporated as one of the control variables. However, the influence of LEV on synchronicity 
is not specified. One possibility is that the higher leverage ratio implies high firm-specific risk, 
which can lead to comparatively lower returns from market and industry information. 
Additionally, holding other variables constant, high LEV indicates low equity weight, and can 
cause low stock price synchronicity. 
3.3.5 The number of firms in the industry (NIND) 
Gul et al. (2010) assert that the number of firms in an industry will affect stock price 
synchronicity. In a highly concentrated industry with only few firms, the daily returns of a 
firm are closely related to the daily returns of an industry and often, a clear distinction 
between the two cannot be made. This will cause a relatively high synchronicity, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, more firms in the industry will induce lower stock price synchronicity. 
Estimation of Eq. (6) is performed to analyze the effects of insider trading on stock 
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synchronicity. NPR is used as the insider trading proxy and the fundamental firm 
characteristics are controlled. 
SYNCH.^ hNPRu + 舰 + y.BM.^ + y.VOL.^ + y,LEV,, + 
y^NINDf, + (YearDummies) + {IndustryDimmies) + s 丨, (6) 
To check the effects of insider trading on firm-specific information release, NPR is substituted 
by IT and PR using Eqs.(7) and (8), respectively. 
SYNCH., 二 , � + , 2 asset,, ” 风 ， , ” 风 丨 + 
NIND. t + (YearDummies) + (IndustryDimmies) + (乃 
SYNCHi’t 二 ; + hPRut + In似從广+ + r.VOL., + VsLEV., + 
/^NIND-, + (YearDummi^) + {IndustryDimmies) + (8) 
The following table exhibits the anticipated signs of the independent and control variables 
according to Hypothesis 1 and previous illustrations. 
Variable NPMT/PR I n a s s e t M i VOL Z ^ F N I N D 
Predicted Sign Negative Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative 
3.4 Ownership structure and corporate governance indicators 
To quantify corporate governance in China, I mainly adhere to Bai et al. (2003) and construct 
various indicators reflecting the performance of corporate governance in the emerging market, 
including tophold, state, foreign, hbshare, duality and cstr2—10. These will be explained in 
detail in the following parts. big4 is also added as a complementary variable. Among these 
variables, tophold, state, and foreign focus more on the ownership structure, whereas the rest 
of the variables are more straightforward indicators of corporate governance. Thus, they are 
categorized into the ownership structure (variables 3.4.1 to 3.4.3) and corporate governance 
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groups (variables from 3.4.4). 
3.4.1 Largest shareholder percentage (tophold) 
The stake of the largest shareholder is denoted as tophold and is used to measure the largest 
shareholder's controlling power over the board. The effect of tophold is complex. On the one 
hand, insider trading by large shareholders and directors is ambiguous. Initially, when the 
ownership concentration is dispersed, the emergence of a large shareholder could unify the 
goals and actions and mitigate insider trading by various small shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). As the number of shares by the largest shareholder increases to a sufficiently 
large stake-holding percentage, tunneling, described by Johnson et al. (2000) as the action to 
transfer the resources out of firms for the benefits of large shareholders, becomes inefficient 
for the firm. Under this circumstance, a higher possibility exists that the largest shareholder 
will utilize inside information to generate abnormal returns. In China however, the largest 
shareholder is usually the state. In this case, insider trading is performed by directors who are 
actually not the largest shareholder; hence, the tunneling effect could decrease as the shares of 
the largest shareholder increase. On the other hand, the larger percentage of stake owned by 
the largest shareholder could decrease monitoring cost, which can induce managers to align 
their interests with the firms more closely (Bai et al., 2004). Consequently, this may lower the 
probability of earlier or non-official revelation of firm-specific information by managers. 
Similarly, because the largest shareholder could be the state, the larger the shares owned by 
the state, the looser corporate governance is, leading to more insider trading by managers. 
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3.4.2 Percentage of shares held by state owner {state) 
The variable state is considered as the measure of stake-holding ratio by the government or 
government-related institutions because of the government's significant effect on ownership 
concentration in China (Bai et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2010). If the government owns a 
considerable share in the company, generally the largest percentage of shares, the largest 
shareholder under such situation is only a central government agency. This will likely to lead 
to inefficient corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). A positive 
relationship between state and stock synchronicity can be expected as the proxy for 
firm-specific information disclosure. However, insider trading could be more severe under the 
comparatively inefficient governance, causing more firm-level information leakage. 
3.4.3 Percentage of shares held by the foreign investors (foreign) 
Foreign investors could invest in the Chinese listed stocks through various ways including 
purchasing through open-market transactions, mergers and acquisition, and strategic investing. 
Their participation requires firms to offer more clear financial reporting in accordance with 
international conventions to prove the competence of firms. In addition, their participation 
improves the performance of firms in terms of their advanced international management 
techniques and ideas. Developed markets have institutional structures that require more 
transparent and protective regulations on revelation of firm-specific information, which may 
influence the involvement of foreign shareholders in corporate governance. Therefore, firms 
with higher percentage of foreign shareholding are under stricter supervision and financial 
transparency request, leading to more firm-specific information disclosure through normal 
channel and less information disclosure through insider trading. 
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To estimate the coefficients for the ownership structure variables, I use the following 
equation: 
SYNCH丨 t y^NPR,^, + fi^tophold.^ ""NPR.^ + y,tophold+pjoreign''NPR., + 
y2 foreign.^ + p�state"^ NPR“ + y声te“t + /s asset+ Yf^BM-^ + /i^OL.^ 
+ y^LEVj, + /gNINDj, + (YearDummisi) + (IndustryDimmies) + , . (9) 
3.4.4 Control power by the 2nd largest to the 10th largest shareholders 
(cstr2_10) and relative control power of the largest shareholder (topvs210) 
Another important supervisory force is the corporate control by the concentration of shares in 
the hands of the second to the tenth largest shareholders, which is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of squares of the percentage points of shareholding by the largest 
shareholder to the largest shareholders at the beginning of year and denoted as cstr2_10. 
The efficiency of the corporate governance is strengthened because large shareholders other 
than the largest one compete for the corporate control when the firm is underperforming, or 
because of the stronger directly monitoring incentive owned by these shareholders. More 
firm-specific information may be revealed through this corporate control fight and better 
supervision, but insider trading is expected to decrease with the increase of cstr2_I0, leading 
to higher stock price synchronicity. The stronger force of the to largest shareholders 
own, the smaller the relative power of the largest shareholder. Through using topvs2_10, 
measured as the stake-holding percentage of largest shareholder minus that of the to 
largest shareholders, the comparison and balancing of the two parties could be clearer. With 
increase of topvs2_10, there would be less monitor or competing force from shareholders 
other than the largest one, which may lead to more information release through insider 
trading. 
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3.4.5 Double-listing on A- and B/H- share exchanges (hbshare) 
La Porta et al. (1999; 2000) maintain that the legal framework performs a crucial role in 
corporate governance and determines the external examining mechanism over the companies. 
Double-listing as both A- and B/H shares requires the company to satisfy audit and 
examination requirements from regulations of both local and overseas stock exchange 
markets, which represent good corporate governance. Hence, hbshare is equal to 1 if there is 
double-listing for the firm and 0 otherwise. 
3.4.6 Audit by the international Big 4 accounting firms {big4) 
Most listed companies in China are audited by local accounting firms with no commonly 
acceptable ranking or verification which can determine their reliability and accuracy. External 
audits enhance accounting transparency and the unbiasedness of financial reporting (Gul et al., 
2010; Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic, 2008). The international Big 4 audit companies perform a 
corporate governance role in emerging markets with highly concentrated ownership structures. 
Their presence is an indicator of good corporate governance because one of their 
responsibilities is to assure the accuracy of corporate accounting report. A dummy variable is 
used, which is equal to 1 if the listed company is audited by the Big 4 and zero otherwise. 
3.4.7 Chairman of the board and CEO duality (Duality) 
Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO of the company is also the chairman 
of the board or a vice chairman. In the presence of duality, the Board of Directors cannot 
monitor the performance of executives fully. Moreover, the person who performs two 
important roles may have extremely influential power to affect or manipulate the decision 
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making and operation processes of the enterprise. I expect duality to have a negative effect on 
corporate governance, which can lead to more information disclosure through irregular 
channels, like insider trading. 
3.4.8 Ratio of independent directors {inddir) 
Apart from the group of internal directors within the corporations, the Board should include a 
number of independent directors who can independently assist in the decision-making process 
of the firm from an outsider's prospective and monitor the performance of managers in 
achieving the agreed objectives. According to the requirement of the Guidance to 
Establishment of Independent Directors System by CSRS in 2001, the number of independent 
directors should not be below one third of the total number of the Board of Directors. Because 
the independent directors are comparatively independent from the listed companies' internal 
interest and executive management team, but only contribute to the development of firm 
strategies, their presence could reflect the effectiveness of corporate control. A higher ratio of 
independent directors {inddir) is used as one of the indicators for good corporate governance, 
which should lead to less private firm information leakage. 
To focus on the effects of ownership structure and corporate governance on the release of 
firm-specific information through insider trading, Eq. (9) is used, where the interaction terms 
of ownership structure variables multiplied by NPR are included. Eq. (10) is used when the 
interaction terms of corporate governance variables multiplied by NPR are included. The 
coefficients I am interested in are those of interaction terms, denoted withy^, instead of>o. 
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SYNCH.^ +/V价2一 10" +y,cstr2_\0 
""NPR^t + y,topvs2_ 10 + p^hbshare''NPR,^ +y,hbshare.^ 
+ P,bigWNPR^t+y�ig\t + NPR^ t + y#ualityi t + P.inddir''NPR.^^ 
+ y.inddir. ^ + y,. Inasset. ^ + y,风’,+ /n^OL.^ + y�耻V" + • (10) 
+ (YearDummies) + (IndustryDimmies) + , 
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4. Descriptive statistics 
As described, insiders such as senior managers, directors, supervisors, and large shareholders 
who own 5% or more of the shares in listed companies are under obligation to disclose 
transactions of their own stocks to the CSRC. Subsequently, the recorded information is 
published by another academic or financial data platform. First, I collect the insider trading 
information from a publicly available SIN A financial database, which includes insider trading 
records of listed A-share companies from mid-2004 to mid-2010. The records consists of 
information on the company name, stock code, insider name, buying or selling type, number 
of shares exchanged, average trading price for total transaction, total value exchanged, 
number of shares the insider holds after transaction, date of transaction, reason for trading, 
and the position each trader holds in the company. Moreover, I utilize the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) financial database^ to gather data on transactions of 
large shareholders, accounting statements, corporate governance materials, capital structures, 
and stock returns. 
The sample period covered in the analysis is from 2007 to 2010 because not until 2007 June 
does the Insider Trading Law in China come into strict enforcement. Stocks in the Growth 
Enterprises Market (GEM) are excluded because of their overall smaller corporation size, 
lower entrance requirement, and minimal industry characteristics compared to SHSE and 
SZSE A share markets. Furthermore, in order to utilize returns of insider transactions, only 
open market purchases and sales are considered into the data sample, which are represented 
by transaction types P and S. 
9 CSMAR, China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database is compiled by the University of Hong Kong and GTA 
information Technology Company Limited in Shenzhen according to the format of CRSP and Compustat; 
http://www.gtadata.com/index.aspx. 
Cash-dividend-adjusted stock returns and value-weighted cash-dividend-adjusted market 
returns are obtained from the CSMAR, which also incorporates other corporate information, 
such as balance sheet, income statement, industry type, daily trading volumes, daily closing 
prices, and equity composition among others. 
It should be noted that institutions such as commercial banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, and mutual funds are excluded from my sample even though they may hold more than 
5% of the total shares because they are institutional investors who are exempt from the insider 
definition of Chinese Security Law and are not obligated to report their transactions. 
4.1 Insider trading 
Table 1 is a summary of the 22848 open market transactions with a dollar value of 
approximately $16208.64 million recorded in my sample^^ During the sample period, 1480 
firms were involved in insider trading, with 1330 in open market sales and 1078 in open 
market purchasesii. There were 6263 total purchases cases and 16585 sales cases, resulting to 
a purchase-to-sale ratio of 0.38, which contrasts with the 2.15:1 in Hong Kong (Cheuk, 2006) 
and 0.7 in the U.S. (Seyhun, 1988). Purchase-to-sale ratio is defined as the total number of 
shares purchased divided by the total number of shares sold. Cheuk (2006) and Seyhun (1988) 
both indicate that insider purchases imply more firm news or information than insider sales. 
To avoid penalty from the authority and to provide fewer signals to the general public, 
insiders tend to break down purchases into smaller transactions, but purchase with larger 
frequency. However, the situation is not quite the same in mainland China. Both average 
1�Consistency checks on buying and selling shares and exchange prices are checked. The 6841 insider transaction records 
not traded on the open market are excluded from the sample, and 7311 transactions with no trading volume, value, and 
prices recorded are eliminated as well. 
n Recent studies on insider trading limit the sample to firms with insider trading activities (e.g., Piotrocki & Roulstone, 2005; 
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number of exchanged shares and value of each transaction for the insiders are larger for sales 
than those for purchases. Despite the fact that the total number of transactions for sales is 2.65 
times of that for purchases, the value per transaction of sales is almost thrice that of purchases. 
As explained in the previous section, the sanctions set for insider trading in China include a 
fine of a maximum of RMB 600,000 (roughly $90,226) which is considerably lower than that 
in the U.S., which is a fine of $1,000,000 for individuals and $2,500,000 for corporations. 
This enormous quantity of insider sales could be noise to information release (Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; Seyhun, 1988; Cheuk, 2006). Based on previous academic studies, I consider 
the Net Purchase Ratio as the main indicator of insider trading intensity; only in this case, it 
may be more influenced by noise. 
Table 2 presents the frequency distribution of insider trading by various classifications on the 
firm-year observations included in my sample. Panel A shows the increasing trend of insider 
trading from 2007 to 2010. The number of firms involved, total value of insider trading, and 
total volume increase dramatically. The average shares per transaction are raised by 45%, 
from 1.20 million per transaction to 1.74 million per transaction. However, the 
purchase-to-sale ratio is not in accordance with the entire increasing trend. The year 2007 
witnessed the most intense insider purchases with a highest purchase ratio of 0.88, whereas 
the intensity of the insider trading in 2010 was lowest with a purchase ratio of 0.24. As 
regards the sample distribution of the four years, the transactions are almost evenly 
distributed. 
12 . , 
Panel B distributes the stocks into 13 categories following the regulation of CSRS . Firms in 
12 According to CSRS document XX on April 3rd 2001, all the listed companies are divided into 13 large categories, 
which are A=Agriculture, B=Mining, C=Manufacture, D=Electricity, gas and water, E=Building and construction, 
F=Transportation and logistics, G=lnformation technology, H=Commerce, l=Finance and insurance, J= Real estate 
K=Service, L=Culture and media, and M=Conglomerate. ^^ 
the manufacturing industry (C) account for the highest percentage of total insider trading 
volume, number of transactions, and total firm-years. The total number of insider transactions 
in agriculture (A), mining (B), electricity and water (D), transportation and logistics (F), and 
culture and media (L) industries are smaller than 500. As for purchases to sales ratios, more 
directors and officers in the electricity, gas and water industry (D), finance and insurance 
industry (I) and real estate industry (F) prefer to sell compared to insiders in other industries. 
Panel C demonstrates the insider trading transactions of different types of insiders in a 
corporation, such as the group of directors, which include chairman of the board, group of 
managers, group of supervisors, and group of large shareholders who hold at least 5% of the 
company shares. As there could be duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board, the insider is 
classified as a manager in this case. The large shareholder is considered to be director if he or 
she sits on the Board of Directors, instead of being a member of the large shareholders group. 
Large shareholders exchange the largest value and volume of shares, which account for 
approximately two thirds and 87% of the total, respectively, whereas directors trade most 
frequently, which occupies one third of the total transaction number. Nevertheless, the high 
trading volume does not imply insider information of good quality. The large shareholders 
may seem involved in most insider trading activities, but their insider information do not 
appear to be as useful as that of the managers and supervisors. The purchase-to-sale ratios of 
the former is only 0.19, comparatively lower than 0.57 and 0.41 of the latter. 
The above 22848 includes the insider trading observations from both SINA and CSMAR, to 
folly reflect the characteristics of insider trading situation in China. However, because of lack 
of accounting and financial records in certain listed companies, only 17611 observations are 
included to calculate net purchasing ratio {NPR). 
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4.2 Synchronicity 
As discussed in the previous section, following Gul et al. (2010) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004), I use the market model Eq. (1) to measure stock price synchronicity. Moreover, 
because of the distinct nature of the China stock market with its tradable and non-tradable 
shares, I construct the market and industry returns use in three ways. First, synchronicity 
(synl) is calculated by the stocks returns that are equally weighted. Second, the stocks returns 
are weighted by the total percentage of market value of tradable shares (syn2). Third, the 
stocks returns are weighted by the total percentage of the shares, including both tradable and 
non-tradable shares (syn3). Table 3 summarizes the R^ and respective stock synchronicities. 
On average, the three methods used obtain similar results ofR^, with a mean of approximately 
0.47 and standard deviation of 0.17. These indicate that approximately 47% of the stock price 
information is attributed to market and industry information, whereas the remainder is 
influenced by the firm-specific information. In the empirical regression analysis, the second 
method is used mainly, that is, syn2 is employed as the variable. 
Table 4 shows the R^ and synchronicities of different years and various industries. Panel A 
demonstrates the annual average stock synchronicity. In the year 2008, stock price 
synchronicity was extremely high (0.4189) compared to those of other years possibly because 
the effects of the global financial crisis on the economy of China began to emerge. The 
depressed market prospect dominated all other news, leading to high stock synchronicity. 
2 • 
Panel B illustrates the synchronicity variation across industries. On average, the R is 
approximately 0.500. Generally, the more firms included in the industry, the lower the and 
corresponding synchronicity. For manufacture (industry C), 1118 firms were involved and the 
corresponding and synchronicity are the lowest at 0.4482 and -0.2733, respectively. 
Similarly, its stock price synchronicity is the highest compared to those of other industries, 
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implying different judgments and behaviors of financial and insurance corporations. 
4.3 Summary of all variables 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. R^ and SYNCH are measured using 
market model Eq. (1), with the market and industry returns weighted by the total percentage 
of market value of tradable shares, that is, syn2 in Table 3. The mean of R^ and SYNCH for 
China are 0.4908 and -0.0581, respectively, which are comparable to the reported mean R^ of 
0.454 in the samples of Gul et al. (2010) and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), but considerably 
larger than the 0.193 for the US as reported in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). The standard 
deviations of R^ and SYNCH are 0.1575 and 0.7269 in the first and last quartile ranges, 
respectively, which once again confirms Gul et al. (2010) as well as the view that there is 
substantial variation in firm-specific information flow into market and across firms. The 
means of NPR and IT are -0.3955 and -0.0030, respectively, showing that there are more 
insider sales than insider purchases each year, and implying a negative aggregate insider 
trading demand. 
As for the ownership structure variables, the mean of tophold at 33.99% reflects a moderate 
concentrated ownership by the largest shareholder. Approximately 49.43% of the largest 
shareholders are government-related, demonstrating the essential role of government in listed 
companies in China. The state-owned shares account for 16.68% of the total shares 
outstanding on average, whereas the stakes owned by foreigners are only 2.15% in the 
sampled firms. Compared to the sample period from 1996 to 2003 in Gul et al. (2010)，a 
considerable decrease is observed in the ratio of state-owned shares and the percentage of 
government-related largest shareholder from 31.6% and 66.5% to 16.68% and 49.43%, 
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respectively. The Split-share Structure Reform^^ which started in 2005 has reduced the 
number of state-owned shares dramatically while considerably increased the percentage of 
negotiable shares from 36% to 66.5% in 2010 Nevertheless, external investment is still 
underdeveloped as shown by the percentage of foreign share-holding being less than 5%. 
The following five variables concentrate on the comparatively explicit corporate governance 
indicators. Only 7.5% of the listed firms are double-listed and 5.67% are audited by the 
reputable international Big 4 audit companies. This highlights the comparatively low 
international standard examination of Chinese listed companies. With the requirement from 
CSRS that the underlining percentage of independent directors in the Board of Directors of a 
listed company is one third, on average, the ratio (inddir) is 35.8% which approximates the 
requirement. Very few companies voluntarily employ more outsider directors to engage in the 
operations of a corporation, making inddir a less crucial variable to indicate corporate 
governance performance in China. 
The previous two stages dealing with the Split-Share Structure are all focused on the reduction of the state-owned shares, 
which are usually the non-tradable shares in the market. On 31 January, 2004, The State Council issued the Opinions about 
how to promote the openness and stabilization of the capital market, which proposed how to solve the split share structure 
of stock market in China, which although a continuation is a creation of the previous two stages. 
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5. Regression analysis 
5.1 Effect of insider trading on stock price synchronicity 
Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) demonstrate that outsiders can profit by 
mimicking transactions by insiders. They point out that imitating the trading by insiders could 
generate abnormal profits. Therefore, although the sizes for insider trading are relatively small 
compared to the trading volume of the entire year, which stands at approximately 0.5%, the 
influence could be amplified because of the involvement of the followers, such as stock 
analysts and individual investors. 
As discussed in previous sections, five control variables are used to explain the stock price 
synchronicity. Based on this, the following model is used: 
SYNCH,, 二/o ”\NPR^’t +/2 \nasset., ”风’,”J^OL" + 
Yf^ NIND“t + (YearDummies) + (Indus tryDimmies) + £•“, (6) 
Table 6 shows the estimation results of Eq. (6) using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
with year and industry dummies included. Column 1 shows that without the control for 
fundamental firm characteristics, insider trading has no significant influence on stock price 
synchronicity because the coefficient is 0.0103 (se=0.0183). After adding each control 
variable separately, all the adjusted R-square values increase with Inasset and BM contributing 
the largest percentages at 15.93% and 9.63%, respectively. As mentioned in Section 3，both 
firm size and book-to-market ratio have a positive relationship with stock price synchronicity. 
In accordance with the three-factor model by Fama and French (1992), firm size and 
book-to-market ratio as the additional firm risks, contribute dramatically to the stock return, 
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whereas the other three variables, stock annual trading volume, leverage ratio, and number of 
firms in each corresponding industry seem to have limited influence on the release of 
firm-specific information through insider trading by using pooled OLS method. Estimates of 
NPR in columns 2, 3, and 7 are significantly negative, indicating that when controlling for 
corporate features variables, the more net insider trading demand is, the lower the 
synchronicity and the more firm-specific information are incorporated into stock price. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
However, the results reported using pooled OLS could be biased because some firms have 
insider trading throughout all the sample years with a firm trading in two years on average. 
The existence of serial correlation between the residuals causes a bias of the estimators in 
Table 6. Therefore, the fixed effect in the panel data is utilized to solve the problem with the 
reported results in Table 7. The t-statistics are adjusted using robust standard errors proposed 
by Daniel Hoechle (2006) which are corrected for serial correlation and heterskedasticity'"^. In 
Table 7, all the estimates for NPR are significantly negative, illustrating the apparent negative 
relationship between insider trading and stock price synchronicity. Estimate for firm size 
(Inasset) is significantly positive (0.1583, se=0.0092), showing that stock price of firms with 
larger size incorporates more market and industry information because of the considerable 
influence of the firms on the market. This can be explained by the difficulty in distinguishing 
market and industry information from the firm-level information under this circumstance. 
However, the estimate becomes insignificant 0.0375 (se=0.0297) when other control variables 
are added, probably because the effect of firm size on synchronicity is explained by other 
control variables. 
For details, see Daniel Hoechle (2006) XTSCC: stata module to calculate robust standard errors for panels with 
cross-sectional dependence. 
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Table 8 shows the estimations using Purchasing Ratio (PR) and insider trading scaled by total 
annual trading volume (IT) as the proxies for insider trading activities. The estimates for 
control variables are quite similar regardless of the proxies selected. When PR and IT are used 
as the insider trading proxies, the coefficient are significantly negative with larger absolute 
value, confirming that insider trading releases firm-specific information and impounds the 
information into stock price. Moreover, insider sales has limited firm-level information 
because estimates for PR is -0.1015 (se=0.0216), which is smaller than that for NPR (-0.0508, 
se=0.0108). With several insider sales as noise, the effect shrinks. 
5.2 Effect of insider trading by different identities on stock price 
synchronicity 
The comparison of information revelation though different insiders in corporations (divided 
into directors which include chairman of the board, managers, supervisors, and large 
shareholders with more than 5% of the total shares outstanding) are reported in Table 9. 
The trading frequency for managers and supervisors are comparatively lower than those for 
directors and large shareholders. There are 569 and 850 firm-year observations for managers 
and supervisors, respectively, and 1275 and 1355 firm-year observations for directors and 
large shareholders, respectively. Within a firm, insiders holding various positions could 
exchange their shares in the same year, thus the summation of observations for different 
position categories does not equal to total firm-year observations. 
As anticipated, the trading behaviors of managers and supervisors reveal more firm-specific 
information. In Table 9, the estimate for NPR in the supervisors group is significantly 
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negative (-0.0538, se二0.0053), supporting the view that supervisors, who are aware of the 
financial situation and who monitor the operation process, have considerable perception of the 
firms. However, insider trading by managers in the sample does not reveal significant 
firm-specific information, as shown by the estimate (-0.0012，se=0.0170). The possible reason 
behind this could be because managers, as daily executives of the enterprises, are occupying 
sensitive positions and are usually the focus when examining insider trading behavior. 
Therefore, to avoid the risks of punishment, they trade least frequently and reveal less 
firm-specific information. 
Although directors and large shareholders trade more intensively, the firm-specific 
information they trade on could be less useful. Large shareholders who are not members of 
the board perform mainly as important investors and equity holders, and their participation in 
the decision-making process is comparatively minimal with the exception of their 
involvement in the General Shareholders' Meeting. They do not participate in the execution of 
detailed procedures. Therefore, their trading behaviors reveal limited firm-specific 
information. As for the directors, although they participate in the planning and decision of 
development, they may not be familiar with the operation process and precise financial status. 
Moreover, they are also closely monitored by the other large shareholders, who require better 
representatives of themselves. Thus, with constrained estimation of the earnings and 
development, they could only provide limited firm-specific information. For insiders in the 
other category, there could be a secretary to the Board, chief engineer, and chief designer, who 
although do not belong to the level of shareholders or senior executive officers, perform key 
and indispensable roles in the corporations. Occasionally, they grasp the essential technology 
or secret of the corporation, and actively participate in the daily operation. Thus, their 
exchange actions could at times offer valuable information. The 10% significant -0.0077 
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(se=0.0041) is reasonable. For robust checks, IT and PR are used as the proxies for insider 
trading. The estimation results are reported in Tables 10 and 11. The results obtained are quite 
similar to the estimation results using NPR. 
According to the Security Law，the relatives of firm executives and large shareholders who 
exchange shares of the specific corporations are also considered insiders. To avoid 
examination and severe punishment, insiders could leak important private information to 
relatives and let them profit from the news. Hence, trading by their relatives could reveal 
more firm-specific information. Eq. (6) is estimated using data from two different groups, 
namely, relatives and insider themselves^^ Table 12 shows that the estimates for insider 
proxies in the relative group are either significantly positive or insignificantly negative, 
whereas the estimates for the other group are all significantly negative. This implies that 
trading by relatives does not reveal more firm-specific information than the trading by the 
insider themselves. The reason may be that trading by relatives based on the most useful 
firm-specific information are not recorded as they are not directly related to the firms and are 
thus difficult to track. Other reasons include the complexity of the trade channels which 
facilitates avoidance of detection and the use of third unrelated party which is not required to 
report the transactions. 
The relatives of different insiders could play important role in information release. According 
to previous analysis, transactions of managers and directors do not offer significant 
firm-specific information. One possible answer is that, under more closed monitoring by 
CSRS, managers and directors are more likely to release their useful firm-specific information 
to their relatives and the transactions by their relatives are more informative. Therefore, a 
15 Because only the Shenzhen Stock Exchange requires the relatives of corporate insiders to report their share trading, only 
the records of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are used for comparison. 
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ratio showing the percentage of transactions by relatives to the total transactions (relratio) is 
designed and added to form the following equation. 
SYNCH it =ro +y\NPR“t + 72 NPR * relmtio+ y^ relratio+ y^ asset ^ ^ 
+yiLEV“t +y 込NIND it + (YearDummies) + {IndustryDimmies) + , 
where 
number of transactions by relatives 
V6- / vci ti O — — — 
{number of transactions by relatives+ number of transactions by insider themselves 
for each insider identity in firm i in year t. If the coefficient the interaction term is negative, 
means the higher the percentage of transactions exchanged by relatives, the more 
firm-specific information is incorporated into the stock price. Table 13 shows the effect of 
insider trading on stock synchronicity by various insider identities. Focusing on the 
coefficients of the interaction term, only significantly negative -0.1452 (0.0263) of 
supervisors indicate that supervisors' relatives hold more useful firm-specific information. 
Estimates 0.0835(0.0244) and 0.0933 (0.0440) demonstrate that relatives of managers and 
directors do not own more firm-specific information to perform their trades compared to other 
identities. Therefore, regardless whether managers and directors trade through their relatives 
or by themselves, transactions by these identities do not release more firm specific into the 
stock price. 
5.3 Effect of insider trading on stock price synchronicity under 
various corporate governance 
The impact of ownership structure on insider trading's information release is illustrated in 
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Table 14. The total effect of insider trading on stock price synchronicity has become more 
complicated because of the interactional terms. 
dSYNCH" 
浙PR ’ 二 ,丨 + P\topholdi t ^PiSOVi, foreign.^ ^P,state, ^ +p,liqushr.^ 
The estimates for interaction terms (5 are emphasized. In column 2, p^ is insignificantly 
different from zero, signifying that the ownership concentration of the largest shareholder 
does not influence the disclosure of firm-specific information through insider trading. This 
supports the ambiguity of the influence anticipated in 3.4.1. In column 3, p^ (0.2443, 
se=0.044) is significantly positive, indicating that the more foreign investors contribute to the 
total share-holding, the less the chances that insider trading will release firm-specific 
information. Foreign investors could act as an external force, a situation which requires better 
corporate governance. Their presence limits the information leakage through insider trading. 
The significantly negative -0.1179 (se=0.0558) as estimate of coefficient for state'^NPR 
demonstrates that when the state-owned shares increase, more firm-specific information are 
incorporated into the stock price. More state-owned shares means there is a larger possibility 
that the central government is the real controller of the corporation or the largest shareholder. 
Hence, administration by their agent could be loose, resulting in the release of more private 
information. 
Table 15 focuses on the impact of corporate governance indicators on insider trading and its 
information disclosure. Higher cstr2�0’ hbshare equal to 1, big4 equal to 1, duality equal to 
0, and larger inddir all signify good corporate governance as explained from section 3.4.5 to 
3.4.9. Cross terms of hbshare and big4 with NPR are all significantly positive, confirming that 
better international and standard audit may restrain the leakage of firm-specific information 
through insider trading. As shown in column 5, estimate for P � i s -0.0227 (se=0.0070). The 
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duality equal to 1 indicates loose monitoring from the Board of Directors, insider trading 
could be severer, and cause lower stock price synchronicity. Inddir is a more useful indicator 
when examining corporate governance in developed countries. In China, majority of the listed 
companies only satisfy the requirement of CSRS to meet the threshold of percentage of 
independent directors, and rarely invite more than the required. Hence, the indicator is 
comparatively ineffective in analyzing Hypothesis 3. As shown, is insignificant from 
zero. Generally, the above indicators show that good corporate governance may decrease the 
firm-specific information leakage through insider trading, supporting hypothesis 3. The 
significant negative estimate (-0.0032, se=0.0006) for cstr2_10 is not clear, because larger 
shareholding from the to the largest shareholder indicates better corporate governance 
and should lead to less information release. Therefore, topvs2_10 is used instead of cstr2_10 
to measure the relative control power of the largest shareholder over the other major ones. 
Still, a baffling estimate (0.0011, se=0.0002), contradict to our anticipation is obtained. The 
increase of topvs2_10 reflects that the power of the to the largest shareholder is 
becoming weak, which should induce more insider trading and lower stock price 
synchronicity. Therefore, the following two equations are estimated by different shareholders 
to explore the puzzle. 
SYNCH., NPRit + P\cstrl — 10,, *NPR丨丨 + y^cstrl — 10 
+ ,3 asset. ^ + y.BM^^ + y,VOL.^ + y.LEV^^^ + y.NIND.^^ + (YearDummies) . (12) 
+ (Indus try Dwimies) + 
SYNCHit + ,丨AWe,’, —10,’, +Y^topvs2_\^ 
+ Y, In asset" + y.BM. ^ + r.VOL. , + y.LEV.^^ + y.NIND.^^ + (YearDummies) (13) 
+ (Indus tryDimmies) + , 
The estimation results are reported in table 16. The more shares are owned from the to the 
IQth largest shareholder, the stronger competence of this party to fight for the corporate 
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control and better corporate administration, therefore, the managers are more constrained to 
trade on firm-specific information. However, the directors of the board may concentrate more 
on the firms' operations through the competence, thus understanding more precisely about the 
firms' performance situation. Subsequently, their insider trading may reveal more 
firm-specific information. In Panel A, -0.0022 (se二0.0008) of cstr2J0*NPR could explain 
more firm-level information is released through directors while 0.0015 (0.0004) demonstrates 
less insider trading activities is taken by managers under better governance and supervision 
from the directors. Panel B provides similar result with topvs2_10 as the independent 
variable. 
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6. Robustness checks 
6.1 insider trading and industry-level return 
Stock price synchronicity as defined in Eq. (1) has been used fundamentally to analyze the 
information incorporation by a considerable number of studies (Dumev et al., 2003; Wurgler, 
2000; Morck et al., 2000; Piotrosky and Roulstone, 2004). However, the explanation is not 
2 9 
direct and appears to be too complicated. Therefore, only R and natural logarithm of R are 
used as dependent variables to reestimate Eq. (6) using the fixed effect method. The results 
are reported in Tables 17 and 18. The estimates of coefficient are all significantly 
negative, confirming the negative relationship between insider trading and stock price 
synchronicity. 
The above synchronicity distinguishes firm-specific information from the market and industry 
level information. However, it does not differentiate between market and industry. Adhering 
to Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), I use the following method to separate industry-level 
information to investigate the impact of insider trading on the industry-level information 
disclosure. 
RET丨丨’d =a + p.MKTRET.^ + + + fi 卿 RET丨“’“ + e “ , � 
REJ]’�’d =a + p,MKTRET„, + p,MKTRET,,,_, + e 丨丨 , (14) 
where RET., , denotes the daily return for each firm i on day d in year t, and MKTRET 
and INDRET dQnoXQ the value-weighted'^ market and industry return, respectively. After 
16 One feature of the Chinese stock market is the existence of negotiated and non-negotiated shares for listed companies, 
particularly state owned enterprises. The value-weighted here means that the stock returns are weighted by the value of the 
tradable shares instead of the value of total shares outstanding. 
estimating Eq. (1) and Eq. (14), the coefficient of determination and R^(14) are obtained 
to calculate the marginal extent of industry-level information. 
DIFF=R2(1)-R2(14). (15) 
The following is the summary table for the indicators for industry-level information content. 
Variable O ^ M e a n S t d . D e v . Wo ^ ^ iWo ^ 
i m 0 . 4 9 0 8 0 . 1 5 7 5 0 . 2 0 3 5 0 . 3 9 2 3 0 . 4 9 3 1 0 . 6 0 2 7 0 . 7 4 6 5 
R^ (12) 2683 0.4470 0.1560 0..1706 0.3482 0.4522 0.5550 0.6960 
DIFF 2683 0.0436 0.0599 0.0015 0.0089 0. .0240 0.0569 0. 1458 
The mean of DIFF is only 0.0436, almost one tenth of the incorporation of the market-level 
information. This demonstrates the comparatively low marginal extent of industry-level 
information. 
DIFF., =ro+ + inasset.^ + y.BM., + 丨，,+ 
+ y^NIND.^^ + (YearDummies) + s" (16) 
The results of the estimation of Eq. (16) using both pooled OLS and fixed effect methods are 
reported in Table 19. On average, the signs for insider trading proxies are negative and 
insignificant, implying that although insider trading could decrease the amount of relative 
industry-level information incorporation ratio, it does not do so in an obvious manner. 
6.2 Effect of insider trading on industry vs. firm-specific earnings 
information 
The earnings information incorporated into the stock price can be decomposed into market, 
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industry-level, and firm-specific information (Ball and Brown，1967). The effect of insider 
trading on industry and firm-specific earnings information is analyzed. If an innovation 
beneficial for the future earnings of a firm exists, which is measured as the return on equity at 
the end of each year, the market-adjusted return for the firm should be positive, and vice versa. 
In this case, I adopt the methodology in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) to decompose the 
innovation into two sources, namely, industry (indinno) and firm (firminno). 
MAR^t =ro+ + yjiudinrio丨 t + yjndirinOi + firminno., + Yeflrninno.^^^ 
+ Y, Inasset. ^ + y.BM, ,^, + Si, (17) 
where , is the market-adjusted-return for firm i in year t, indinnois an indicator for 
the innovation of the industry as compared to the whole market, and firminno丨,is an 
indicator for the innovation of the firm compared to the industry it belongs to in year t. The 
innovation for industry and firm are as defined in the same context as in the study ofAyers 
and Freeman (1997). 
indinnoi, = IE., -ME� (18) 
firminno 丨 t = MIOE 丨“ —IE., ’ （19) 
where IE.,is the median annual change in firm earnings (AROE) for all firms in the same 
industry to which firm i belongs to in year t and ME, is the median IE. , for all industries in 
year t. 
The summary statistics for all the variables is displayed in Table 20 panel A. Due to the lack 
of accounting reports of some firms in the year 2010 and the use of firms' earning 
improvements in the following year, data in year 2009 and 2010 are excluded from the sample 
to avoid the missing data bias. The mean oi indinno (0.0033) is larger than that of firminno 
(0.0012), whereas the standard deviation of indinno (0.0099) is smaller than that of firminno 
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(0.1600), implying that on average, innovation comes from the advancement of the entire 
industry instead of specific firms alone. However, there is substantial variation among the 
development and earnings improvement of firms. Panel B shows the estimation results of Eqs. 
(17) and (20). Comparing the results shown in Row (1) with that in Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004), the coefficients of industry innovation indicators are shown to be all negative. This 
means that the collective innovation of the entire industry could reduce the 
market-adjusted-retum of a firm. This is reasonable because when the development of the 
entire industry achieves a higher level, it takes the individual firm greater effort to exceed the 
industry's performance (Ayers and Freeman, 1997). On the contrary, the firm innovation in 
year t is significantly positive, indicating that the firm's own development plays a more 
important role in contributing to the increase in stock return. 
Subsequently, the insider trading proxy NPR is added to Eq. (17) to analyze the impact of 
insider trading on the earning's information role from industry and firm. 
MAR^ t 二八 + 雄’t+\ + YjMinno^ ^ + y^indinno- ^^^ + /^indinno.^^^ * NPR^ ^ 
+ rsfirminno., + + y^firminno^^,,, * NPR^, + y^ In asset-^ + y^BM.^ + £“�.(20) 
From Table 20 panel B, it can be seen that the coefficient of firm's innovation is more 
significantly positive (3.0946, se=0.8573) when insider trading is incorporated in Eq. (20). 
Moreover, the coefficient for firminnoi,(+！*NPRt+/ (1.6233, se=0.6699) is significantly 
positive as well, indicating that insider trading facilitates the reflection of earning innovation 
of firms in the stock price more quickly. As for the industry innovation, estimates for 
ndinnOi,i+j'^NPRt+i are not significant from zero, meaning insider trading may not assist the 
49 
flow of industry information into the stock valuation. This result confirms my previous 
estimation result that more firm-specific information is disclosed through insider trading. 
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7. Conclusions 
I investigate whether and under what circumstances stock price synchronicity is associated 
with insider trading transactions under the unique institutional structure in China. According 
to previous studies, insider trading could reflect both firm-specific and market-level 
information. Through the estimation, I provide evidence that more firm-level information is 
incorporated into the stock price through insider trading. Additionally, I explore cases where 
more firm private information is disclosed and according to the types of insider. Supervisors, 
as the monitor of the operation and financial reporting of a corporation, contribute most to the 
information revelation through their transactions, compared to other types of insider. 
Surprisingly, managers offer limited firm-specific information through their trading behavior, 
which may be due to the fact that they are closely examined by regulatory institutions and 
hence limit their revelations in an attempt to avoid being penalized for insider trading. 
Moreover, although directors and large shareholders who own more than 5% of the total 
shares outstanding trade most frequently, they facilitate less firm information flow into market. 
Additionally, firm-specific information is not additionally impounded into the stock price 
through trading and transaction behavior of relatives of insiders. On the contrary, investors 
following the exchange behavior of insiders themselves may be aware of more firm news. 
Finally, by using corporate governance indicators such as shareholding percentage from the 
2nd to iQth largest shareholder and by foreign investors, whether the stock is double-listed on 
both A-share and B/H-share exchanges, whether the company is audited by the Big 4 
international audit firms, the existence of duality, and percentage share of independent 
variables, I found that the following conjecture is supported: firms with good corporate 
governance may limit the information leakage through insider trading. If more shares are 
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owned by the state, the revelation of information through insider trading will be enhanced 
because agents representing the central government do not perform stringent monitoring and 
practice loose corporate governance. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
尺2 The R2 of the market model in Eq.() for firms listed in the A-share 
market 
Logarithmic transformation of R for the market model in Eq.(), 
SYNCH computed as log R^)] to measure the extent incorporation of 
firm-specific information into the stock price 
Net Purchasing ratio, defined as the net of shares purchased by insider 
NPR minus shares sold by insider divided by the sum of total insider shares 
transacted for each firm-year to measure the insider trading intensity 
Insider trading proxy, an alternative proxy for insider trading intensity 
as the robust test variable, and defined as the net of shares insider 
IT purchased minus shares insider sold scaled by the annual trading 
volume for each firm-year 
Purchasing ratio, an alternative proxy for insider trading intensity as the 
PR robust test variable, and defined as the shares insider purchased divided 
by the sum of total insider shares transacted for each firm-year 
The difference ofR^ of the market model in Eq.() and that of the model 
DIFF in Eq. () to measure the incorporation of industry-level information into 
stock price 
Firm size defined as logarithmic form of the firm's total asset at the end 
I腦过 of the year 
Book value of equity to market value of equity for each firm at the 
BM beginning of the year 
Trading volume computed as total number of shares traded in a year, 
州L divided by the total shares outstanding at the end of the year 
lev The leverage ratio at the end of the year 
删D The number of firms in the industry which the firm belongs to 
The percentage of transactions traded by the relatives to the total insider 
transactions during the specific year for each firm 
The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder at beginning of 
—old y e a r 
liqushr The percentage of tradable shares of the total shares outstanding 
state The percentage of shares held by state owner(s) at beginning of the year 
The percentage of shares held by the foreign investors (B-share and /or 
fo 代胁 H-share holders) 
The natural logarithm of the sum of squares of the percentage points of 
cstr2_l 0 shareholding by the 2"�largest shareholder to the 10出 largest 
— shareholder at beginning of year 
The stack-holding percentage of the largest shareholder minus that 
topvs2J 0 owned by the largest shareholder to the 10出 largest 
An indicator which is equal to one if a firm issues both A-share and 
hbshare B-share/H-share at the same time, and zero otherwise 
An indicator variable for auditor quality. It is equal to one if a firm is 
audited by one of the international Big 4 audit firms and zero otherwise 
duality An indicator which is equal to 1 if the CEO is the chairman or a vice 
80 
chairman of the board of directors and 0 otherwise 
The ratio of the number of independent directors who are not members 
inddir of the management team to the total number of board of directors, to 
measure the degree of outside control of the board. 
Market adjust return for stock i in year t，which is equivalent to stock 
礼’t return in year t minus the market return in year t 
Return on equity for each firm-year, equaling to firm i's earnings 
ROE divided by its beginning of the year market value. 
IE Median ofAROE for all the firms in year t in the same industry 
ME Median of IE for all the industries in year t 
. Innovation of industry, which is equivalent to lE-ME in the same year, 
Indinno representing the earning information for the industry 
Innovation of firm, which is equivalent XoAROE -IE in the same year, 
firminno representing the earning information for the firm 
80 

C U H K L i b r a r i e s 
0 0 4 8 6 5 8 8 8 
